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in Eastern Europe
Unemployment in Hungary and Poland has risen dramatically since late 1989 when
privatization and economic reform began to accelerate. The overnight disappearance of the Soviet
market and elimination of state subsidies and price controls transformed these shortage economies
into labor surplus economies. Registered unemployment in Hungary rose from 23,000 in 1990 to
705,000 in 1993 in a labor force of close to 5 million. Since then the Hungarian unemployment
rate has fallen somewhat, but remains in double-digits, with total employment having fallen by 25
percent since 1990. Officially measured unemployment in Poland jumped from zero in 1989 to
16.4 percent in 1994. During this period, Polish civilian employment declined by more than 2
million. Figure 1 (not available in this document) summarizes these unemployment trends.
To ease the hardship associated with worker dislocation and to maintain social stability,
the governments of Hungary and Poland acted quickly to create unemployment compensation
systems, along with a variety of active labor programs. Policy measures adopted in the two
countries include nearly the full menu of active labor programs found in nations with developed
market economies: placement service, retraining, self-employment assistance, wage subsidy,
public service employment, job creation investments, work sharing, and early retirement subsidy.
These are available in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Active Labor Programs in Hungary and Poland
Active labor program Hungary Poland
Placement service Yes Yes
Retraining Yes Yes
Self-employment assistance Yes Yes
Wage subsidy for hiring Long term unemployed Recent graduates
Public service employment1 Yes Yes
Job creation investments Yes Yes
Work sharing Yes No
Early retirement subsidy Yes No
1. Poland also has Intervention Works projects operated by private sector employers.
Since 1990, the Upjohn Institute has worked with the Ministry of Labor in Hungary to
develop evaluation and planning procedures for labor market support programs. In 1993, the
Institute initiated a similar project in Poland. The projects have been coordinated by the World
Bank and the U.S. Department of Labor.
Given the disappointing historical experience Hungary and Poland had with central
planning, both countries have sought ways to manage employment policy in a decentralized way.
In each country, the legal framework of program options is established by national legislation.
Funding for employment measures is allocated to the provincial governments, which then
implement specific program activities to address regional needs. To support decentralized decision
making, while at the same time requiring accountability and efficiency from provincial
governments, both Poland and Hungary are establishing performance-based management systems
for evaluation and planning of their active labor programs.
The management systems include performance indicators specified to measure the success
of each active labor program in the different provinces and local areas. The guiding principle in
developing performance indicators was to emphasize outcomes rather than processes. This
emphasis was particularly important in government agencies where, until recently, hoarding of
resources and organization building had been primary goals.
The performance indicators focus on desired outcomes such as employment in private
unsubsidized jobs. They are timely measures that can be readily implemented and should become a
natural tool for managers. They are intentionally simple, so as to minimize the data collection
burden on provincial governments. The plan is adjust performance targets for the local economic
conditions and client mix. Such adjustment will make comparisons across provinces and programs
more fair. In addition, the adjustments for client mix should discourage provincial governments
from attempting to boost performance through the practice of creaming - inflating a program’s
success rate by limiting services to only the most qualified applicants. By adjustment weights,
performance standards will be relaxed for provinces providing services to low skilled, low-
educated, long-term unemployed or other specified hard to reemploy groups. Such targeting of
services will raise the social dividend of employment policy.
In November, the Upjohn Institute will conduct training in performance management of
active labor programs for all 49 provincial labor offices in Poland. In 1993, similar training was
completed in Hungary for all 20 country labor centers.
The experience of Hungary illustrates the process of system development. Following
months of debate, providing users of the system a strong sense of ownership and control,
consensus on the list of performance indicators was reached in October 1992. Deliberations
involved representatives from the Ministry, National Labor Center, Labor Research Institute,
Budapest University of Economics, three country labor centers, and the Upjohn Institute. To
illustrate, performance indicators for retraining programs were specified to be
• Average cost per trainee employed at follow-up
• Proportion of trainees employed at follow-up
• Average cost per training program entrant
• Proportion of entrants who successfully complete training
• Average monthly earnings of trainees employed at follow-up
• Proportion of employed trainees working in occupation of training at follow-up.
The performance indicators system was then pilot tested in three Hungarian counties.
Despite some reluctance at senior management levels, nationwide implementation of performance
management began in 1994. The impetus to set the system in motion came from a 1993 Auditor
General report questioning the effective use and control of the decentralized Employment Fund.
One year after follow-up surveys began, a national conference on the experience with
performance indicators was held at the National Labor Center in Budapest. Wide-ranging
comments about the system were offered from the 20 counties and from federal representatives.
Due to the impact on survey response rates and the minimal dispersion in occupational wage
distribution, the reemployment wage indicator of reemployment job quality was eliminated.
While federal partners at the meeting assured counties that the performance indicator
results would be regarded as preliminary and used for developing an adjustment methodology for
inter-county comparison, the counties themselves cited a variety of immediate uses of the
information. The counties reported the information to be particularly valuable in assessing
contract service providers. It was also noted that the impending reduction of active labor
programs to four - retraining, public service employment, wage subsidies for long term
unemployed, and self employment assistance - will likely simplify the system and speed
implementation of the computerized system to support performance management.
The Ministry of Labor in Hungary is currently revising the annual planning and budget
allocation process for active labor programs. Master plans for the counties and Ministry will be
set in place and guidelines for county annual plans based in part on program performance will be
prepared. The Ministry is considering an algorithm which weights program performance 10
percent in budget allocation decisions. Guidelines for performance-based contracts to service
providers are also under consideration. The Ministry is pursuing a positive approach to
performance management by emphasizing high performance, with the likely response to poor
performance being management assistance to counties.
In the past, the transfer of knowledge about employment policy has been from the mature
market economies to the less-developed countries. Even the performance management systems
developed in Hungary and Poland are adapted from methods used in nations with developed
market economies. But because programs in Hungary and Poland are operated in a coordinated
way, the systems provide a simultaneous view of the effectiveness of all programs, thereby clearly
revealing policy trade-offs. These management systems are models for other nations in Central
and Eastern Europe, and they may also provide insights for nations with much longer histories of
employment policy.
Christopher J. O’Leary is a senior economist at the Upjohn Institute.
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